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 1  
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
CASE NO. 3:16-cv-03615-JD  
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 6, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as 
they may be heard, Plaintiffs Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”) and HomeAway.com, Inc. (“HomeAway”) 
will and hereby do move for a preliminary injunction.    
Plaintiffs respectfully request an order enjoining Defendant City and County of San 
Francisco (the “City”) from enforcing against them amended sections 41A.5(e) and 41A.5(g)(4)(C)-
(E) of the San Francisco Administrative Code (the “Ordinance”).1     
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June, the Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance (the “Original Ordinance”) requiring 
Hosting Platforms to “verify” that short-term rental listings posted on their websites by third parties 
have valid registration numbers, or risk criminal and civil penalties for their users’ listing of 
unregistered rentals.  Declaration of Jonathan H. Blavin (“Blavin Decl.”), Ex. A at 3-5.  Plaintiffs 
filed this action, asserting the ordinance was preempted by Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and violates the First Amendment.  As Supervisor David 
Campos (a sponsor of the law) said, the City “read [Airbnb’s]” preliminary injunction motion, 
“said, you make a good point,” and decided “we’re going to modify.”  Blavin Decl., Ex. B at 2.   
The Board passed amendments in August.  Supervisor Campos has said the Board made “a 
very few set of modest revisions,” and the “intent of” the Ordinance remains the same.   Id., Ex. C 
at 1.  So does its effect.  The Ordinance, like the original law, imposes criminal and civil liability on 
Hosting Platforms for unregistered short-term rentals listings.  It also requires Hosting Platforms to 
verify that a rental is “lawfully registered … at the time [it] is rented.”  § 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  The 
Ordinance suffers the same defects as the original law (and more) and violates Section 230 and the 
First Amendment.  The Court should therefore enjoin its enforcement.2 
                                                 
1 A copy of the Ordinance as amended is attached as Appendix A.  The full version of Chapter 41A, 
before amendment by the Ordinance, is attached as Appendix B.  All citations to sections of Chapter 
41A refer to the San Francisco Administrative Code as amended by the Ordinance.   
2 This action is both an as-applied and a facial challenge.  It is as-applied in that it seeks only to 
prohibit the City from enforcing the Ordinance against Plaintiffs; and it is a facial challenge in that 
the Ordinance, on its face, is invalid in certain respects.  See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 
629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Section 230 prohibits “treat[ing]” websites “as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  In other words, 
websites cannot be liable based on content provided by third parties.  Under settled law, this 
immunity extends to the processing of third-party transactions resulting from such content.  The 
Ordinance violates this proscription by imposing severe criminal and civil penalties on Hosting 
Platforms that collect a fee and provide “Booking Services,” defined as reservation or payment 
services that “facilitate” short-term rental transactions, where the property at issue is not “lawfully 
registered.”  §§ 41A.4, 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  The Ordinance thus requires Hosting Platforms to monitor, 
verify, and effectively block user listings, in violation of Section 230.  That platforms accept a fee or 
provide “reservation” or “payment services” does not mean the CDA does not apply.  Indeed, if 
parties could evade the law in this manner, this would leave a gaping hole in Section 230’s 
protections and undermine its core objectives, including “the development of e-commerce.”  Batzel 
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).    
The Ordinance also violates the First Amendment.  It is a content-based restriction that 
burdens protected speech, i.e., third-party rental listings, published on Hosting Platforms, and is 
therefore subject to “heightened judicial scrutiny” under the First Amendment.  Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).  To meet this standard, the City must show the Ordinance is 
narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest.  But the “normal method of deterring 
unlawful conduct” is to punish the conduct, not prohibit speech about it.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 
U.S. 514, 529 (2001).  The City cannot show the obvious alternative of enforcing its laws against 
residents who rent properties in violation of the law would be ineffective or inadequate.  Just the 
opposite:  The City can (and does) enforce its laws against hosts who violate them.  The Ordinance 
also violates the First Amendment because it imposes criminal penalties on Hosting Platforms 
without requiring any showing of scienter.  The City has impermissibly created a strict-liability 
crime for providing Booking Services in connection with rentals that are not “lawfully registered,” 
even if the platform has no knowledge of that fact.  But the Supreme Court has rejected efforts to 
impose strict criminal liability for the publication of allegedly unlawful third-party content because 
such restrictions chill protected, lawful speech. 
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Absent this Court’s intervention, the Ordinance will cause Plaintiffs irreparable harm.  “The 
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).  So, too, courts have found 
irreparable harm where, as here, a plaintiff faces a threat of prosecution, a substantial disruption to 
its business, and erosion of customer goodwill, under a preempted state law.   Given this palpable 
threat of irreparable harm, the equities tip sharply in Plaintiffs’ favor, and the public interest is 
served by enforcing the Constitution and federal law.  At the same time, an injunction would not 
prevent the City from continuing to enforce its laws against residents who violate them.  The Court 
should enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance against Hosting Platforms such as Plaintiffs.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Airbnb and HomeAway 
Airbnb and HomeAway provide Internet platforms through which persons desiring to book 
accommodations (“guests”) and those listing accommodations available for rental (“hosts”) can find 
each other, make arrangements, and enter into agreements for rentals.  Airbnb operates Airbnb.com, 
and HomeAway operates HomeAway.com, VRBO.com, and VacationRentals.com.3  See 
Declaration of David Owen (“Owen Decl.”), ¶ 2; Declaration of Bill Furlong (“Furlong Decl.”), ¶ 2.   
Neither Airbnb nor HomeAway manages, operates, leases or owns the accommodations 
listed by third-party hosts, and neither is a party to the agreements between guests and hosts for the 
booking of rentals.  Owen Decl. ¶ 4; Furlong Decl. ¶ 3.  Plaintiffs’ websites provide means by 
which hosts can list their accommodations and guests can locate and connect with hosts.  Owen 
Decl. ¶ 3; Furlong Decl. ¶ 2.  Hosts provide the content for listings, such as descriptions and rental 
prices, and the dates and lengths of stay their properties are available.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Furlong 
Decl. ¶ 6.  Plaintiffs’ terms of service require hosts to agree they are solely responsible for the 
content of their listings.  See Owen Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 1 at 6 (hosts “alone are responsible for any and 
all Listings and Member Content [they] post.”); Furlong Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. B § 8 (“All property 
listings on the Site are the sole responsibility of the” owner).  Plaintiffs do not review all listings 
                                                 
3 The three websites are referred to collectively as “HomeAway” or the “HomeAway websites.” 
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before they appear on their websites.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19; Furlong Decl. ¶ 6.   
Plaintiffs also require hosts (and guests) to comply with local laws in listing and renting 
units.  Airbnb’s Terms of Service state: “HOSTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND HOW THE LAWS 
WORK IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CITIES.  SOME CITIES HAVE LAWS THAT RESTRICT 
THEIR ABILITY TO HOST PAYING GUESTS FOR SHORT PERIODS….  IN MANY CITIES, 
HOSTS MUST REGISTER, GET A PERMIT, OR OBTAIN A LICENSE BEFORE LISTING A 
PROPERTY OR ACCEPTING GUESTS.  CERTAIN TYPES OF SHORT-TERM BOOKINGS 
MAY BE PROHIBITED ALTOGETHER.”  Owen Decl., Ex. 1 at 1.  HomeAway’s Terms and 
Conditions state that hosts “are responsible for and agree to abide by all laws, rules, ordinances, or 
regulations applicable to the listing of their rental property …, including but not limited to laws … 
[and] requirements relating to taxes….”  Furlong Decl., Ex. B, § 1.  In addition, Plaintiffs 
encourage hosts to be aware of the laws in their jurisdictions and provide information on their 
websites about San Francisco’s laws specifically.  See Owen Decl., Exs. 2-3 (Airbnb “Responsible 
Hosting” pages, referencing and summarizing San Francisco laws, providing links, and informing 
hosts about including registration numbers in listings); Furlong Decl. ¶ 8 (HomeAway information 
about San Francisco laws and requirements).4   
Airbnb and HomeAway have different models and provide different options for hosts and 
guests to communicate and make arrangements with one another.  Airbnb allows guests to make 
arrangements with hosts through online booking and enables the provision of payment processing 
services to permit hosts to receive payments electronically.  Owen Decl. ¶ 3.  For use of its services, 
including its publication and listing services, Airbnb receives a fee from both guests and hosts, 
which is a percentage of the rental fee as set by the host.  Id. ¶ 8.  
HomeAway hosts pay for services in one of two ways.  First, they may buy subscriptions to 
                                                 
4 Also, as part of the Airbnb Community Compact, the company provides solutions tailored to the 
needs of cities like San Francisco with historic housing challenges.  See Owen Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. 4.  
For example, Airbnb voluntarily removes listings that it believes may be offered by hosts with 
multiple “entire home” listings or by unwelcome commercial operators.  See id. ¶ 14.  If Airbnb is 
alerted to shared spaces or private rooms that appear to be operated by such operators or do not 
reflect the community vision, it generally removes such listings.  See id.  Within the last year, Airbnb 
has removed numerous San Francisco listings as part of its Community Compact.  See id. ¶¶ 14-15 
& Ex. 5.   
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advertise their properties for a specified period of time, such as a year.  Furlong Decl. ¶ 4.  Second, 
they may choose a pay-per-booking option, paying for the services based on a percentage of the 
total cost of a confirmed booking.  Id.  Under this second arrangement, hosts and guests may make 
rental arrangements through online booking and online payment services using a third-party 
processor.  Id. ¶ 10.  Hosts and guests may also make arrangements by communicating through a 
messaging service on HomeAway’s websites or by exchanging phone numbers or personal email 
addresses and communicating directly.  Id. ¶ 9.  In instances when hosts and guests arrange rentals 
and payments on their own, HomeAway may have no information about whether rentals occurred 
or only such information as is reflected in host-guest communications through the website.  Id.  
B. San Francisco’s Regulatory Scheme Governing Short-Term Rentals 
1. Background Regarding Short-Term Rental Regulation in the City 
In October 2014, the Board of Supervisors amended Chapter 41A (effective February 2015) 
to make short-term rentals lawful in San Francisco, subject to certain limitations and requirements.  
“Permanent Residents” who have occupied their units for at least 60 days may offer their homes for 
“Short-Term Rental.”  §§ 41A.4; 41A.5(g).5  Residents must register their properties and “include[] 
the Department-issued registration number on any Hosting Platform listing.”  §§ 41A.5(g)(1)(F), 
(g)(2)(A).  In addition, the amendments require Hosting Platforms to notify users of the City’s 
short-term rental regulations and collect and remit Transient Occupancy Taxes (“TOT”) required 
under the Business and Tax Regulations Code.  § 41A.5(g)(4)(A)-(B).   
To register their properties, hosts must complete a two-step process.  First, they must obtain 
a Business Registration Certificate from the Treasurer & Tax Collector.  Blavin Decl., Ex. D at 4.  
Second, they must schedule an in-person appointment with the Office of Short-Term Rentals 
(“OSTR”) and provide an application, proof of residency, Business Registration Certificate, and 
proof of at least $500,000 in liability insurance and that the property does not violate any City code.  
Id.  Thereafter, they must submit quarterly reports of all stays.  Id. at 2.  Hosts, unless exempted, 
must also obtain a Certificate of Authority from the Treasurer & Tax Collector and file monthly 
                                                 
5 There is no limit on the number of days per year a unit may be rented if it is “hosted”; if the host is 
not on site, the unit cannot be rented more than 90 days a year.  § 41A.5(g)(1)(A).   
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reports disclosing the rent received and TOT due.  Id., Ex. E at 3-4.  In addition, earlier this year, 
the City’s Assessor-Recorder announced that hosts must pay taxes on physical assets, meaning they 
must report the cost and acquisition year of “each piece of furniture, equipment, and supplies used 
in renting [their] residence, including furnishings from the kitchen, living room, dining room, and 
bedroom, such as televisions, computers, bed frames, mattresses, tables, chairs, stoves, fridges, 
appliances, dish washers, clothes washers and dryers, entertainment units, artwork, and any other 
property that [they] provide to [their] renters.”  Id., Ex. F at 1. 
To administer and enforce its laws, the City created the OSTR.  An April 2016 report of the 
City’s Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office (prepared at the request of Supervisor Campos) 
observed that the OSTR had been active in pursuing enforcement of the City’s short-term rental 
laws by “levy[ing] fines against hosts found to be non-compliant,” including nearly $700,000 as of 
February 2016.  Id., Ex. G at 21.  The report also stated that the City expected to increase its efforts 
to promote compliance by hosts when the “OSTR became fully staffed in December 2015,” and 
predicted this would “further close [the] gap” “between the number of registered hosts and the 
number of hosts advertising short-term rentals on online platforms.”  Id.   
2. The Original Ordinance Imposing Liability on Hosting Platforms 
In June 2016, the Board of Supervisors enacted the Original Ordinance, the City’s first 
attempt to impose requirements on Hosting Platforms to monitor and block or remove listings 
allegedly in violation of City law.  The Original Ordinance required platforms to verify that all 
listings had a valid registration number.  Hosting Platforms could comply with the requirement by 
either “[p]roviding the verified registration number on each listing” or “[s]ending the verified 
registration number, Residential Unit street address (including any unit number), and host name” to 
the OSTR by email “prior to posting the listing.”  Blavin Decl., Ex. A at 4.   
Supervisor Campos explained the intent of the Original Ordinance was to “hold[] Airbnb 
and other hosting platforms accountable for advertising illegal short term rentals.”  Id., Ex. H at 1.  
He said it targeted the Hosting Platforms and “change[d] [the methods of] enforcement” for the 
City’s short-term rental regulations.  Id., Ex. I at 2.  Supervisor Aaron Peskin (who, with Supervisor 
Campos, co-sponsored the Original Ordinance) similarly said the City sought to “hold[] the hosting 
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platforms accountable” for listings provided by users.  Id., Ex. J at 1.  The City Attorney’s Office 
acknowledged that the Original Ordinance could raise “issues under the Communications Decency 
Act” but claimed it had been drafted “in a way that minimizes” those issues by regulating “business 
activities” instead of “content.”  Id., Ex. K at 3.   
3. The City’s Withdrawal of the Original Ordinance After Airbnb and 
HomeAway Sued 
With the Original Ordinance scheduled to take effect July 24, 2016, Airbnb filed its 
complaint and a preliminary injunction motion in this action on June 27, 2016.  (ECF Dkt. Nos. 1, 
3.)  HomeAway filed a complaint in intervention five days later.  (ECF Dkt. No. 24.)  Plaintiffs 
contended the ordinance violated, among other laws, the CDA and the First Amendment.  In a 
telephonic conference on July 1, 2016, the Court set a briefing schedule for the preliminary 
injunction motion, with a hearing date of September 7, 2016.  (ECF Dkt. No. 19.)  The City agreed 
to stay enforcement of the Original Ordinance until the Court’s ruling. 
Faced with Plaintiffs’ challenges, the Board of Supervisors decided to withdraw the Original 
Ordinance and pursue an amended ordinance.  On July 12, 2016, Supervisor Campos introduced the 
Ordinance to the Board.  He explained that he offered the Ordinance because the City “read 
[Airbnb’s] brief,” “said, you make a good point,” and decided “we’re going to modify” the 
ordinance.  Blavin Decl., Ex. B at 2.  On July 19, the Court granted the City’s request for a stay of 
proceedings to allow the Board to consider the proposed amendments.  (ECF Dkt. No. 36.)6 
4. The Amended Ordinance Imposing Liability on Hosting Platforms 
The Ordinance passed the Board of Supervisors on August 2, 2016 and becomes effective on 
                                                 
6 San Francisco is not the only city to conclude that imposing liability on Hosting Platforms for 
users’ listings is impermissible.  In July, Airbnb and HomeAway filed suit challenging a similar 
ordinance passed by the City of Anaheim.  See Nos. 8:16-cv-1398, 8:16-cv-1402 (C.D. Cal.).   
Unlike the law here, the Anaheim law contained a “savings clause,” which stated the law “shall be 
interpreted in accordance with otherwise applicable state and federal law(s) and will not apply if 
determined by the city to be in violation of any such law(s).”  Anaheim Mun. Code § 4.05.120.030; 
see id. § 4.05.130.0103.  On August 10, 2016, Anaheim’s City Attorney stated in a letter to Airbnb 
and HomeAway that, given “the current state of the law,” the City had determined that its ordinance 
“does not and will not be applied to Airbnb, HomeAway or other hosting platforms,” and “the City 
will not seek to enforce” the law “against hosting platforms.”  Blavin Decl., Ex. L at 1.   As a 
spokesperson for Anaheim stated, “[a]fter considering federal communications law, we won’t be 
enforcing parts of Anaheim’s short-term rental rules covering online hosting sites.”  Id., Ex. M at 1.   
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September 11.  According to Supervisor Campos, the amendments made “a very few set of modest 
revisions,” and the “intent of” the Ordinance remains the same.   Blavin Decl., Ex. C at 1.  The 
Ordinance, like the Original Ordinance, imposes criminal and civil liability on Hosting Platforms 
for short-term rental listings that are not “lawfully registered.”  § 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  It states: 
A Hosting Platform may provide, and collect a fee for, Booking Services in 
connection with short-term rentals for Residential Units [in the City] only when 
those Residential Units are lawfully registered . . . at the time the Residential Unit 
is rented for short term rental. 
Id.  A “Hosting Platform” is defined as any entity: 
that participates in the short-term rental business by providing, and collecting or 
receiving a fee for, Booking Services . . . usually . . . through an online platform 
that allows an Owner to advertise the Residential Unit through a website provided 
by the Hosting Platform. 
§ 41A.4.  “Booking Services,” in turn, are defined as: 
any reservation and/or payment service provided by a person or entity that 
facilitates a short-term rental transaction between an Owner or Business Entity 
and a prospective tourist or transient user and for which the person or entity 
collects or receives, directly or indirectly through an agent or intermediary, a fee 
in connection with the reservation and/or payment services provided for the short-
term rental transaction.   
Id.  In short, the Ordinance bars Hosting Platforms from providing Booking Services or collecting 
fees in relation to such services without first verifying that every property listed by hosts for rental 
is “lawfully registered” with the OSTR “at the time the Residential Unit is rented.”  The Ordinance 
states that “any Hosting Platform that provides a Booking Service … in violation of the … 
obligations under this Chapter 41A shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” punishable by a fine of 
$1,000, six months in jail, or both.  § 41A.5(e).  In addition, it provides for “administrative 
penalties” up to $484 for initial violations and up to $968 for subsequent violations.  § 41A.6(d)(1).   
The Ordinance also imposes other obligations on Hosting Platforms that were not called for 
by the Original Ordinance.  It requires a monthly “affidavit to the [OSTR] verifying that the 
Hosting Platform has complied with subsection (g)(4)(C)” (i.e., the obligations imposed on 
platforms) “in the immediately preceding month.”  § 41A.5(g)(4)(D).  It also requires each platform 
to maintain records of all short-term bookings for a three-year period, § 41A.5(g)(4)(E), and creates 
new subpoena powers for the OSTR to obtain those records, § 41A.7(b)(2). 
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City officials have indicated that if Hosting Platforms charge “solely an advertisement fee,” 
or do not charge any fees for rental listings (such as Craigslist), they are not covered by the 
Ordinance.  See Blavin Decl., Ex. N at 3 (Deputy City Attorney stating that if platforms charge 
“solely an advertisement fee,” not subject to law); id. at 2 (Supervisor Campos stating if site 
“simply lists advertisements on its platforms and does not charge a fee, and we have the example of 
Craigslist,” it is not subject to law); id., Ex. O at 3 (Deputy City Attorney stating Craigslist not 
subject to law).  Supervisor Campos’s office staff stated the Ordinance is intended to cover those 
sites where there is a “business transaction plus the advertising” of the listing.  Id., Ex. O at 2.     
According to Supervisor Campos, the Ordinance, like the Original Ordinance, is intended to 
“regulat[e] the business activity of hosting platforms, not website content,” id., Ex. N at 1, by 
requiring that they “do business with law-abiding hosts,” rather than those who are “out of 
compliance with the law,” id., Ex. C at 1-2.  Supervisor Peskin has said the law aims to target 
“unscrupulous speculators,” not “mom and pop” hosts.  Id., Ex. P at 1; see also id., Ex. O at 1-2 
(similar statements of Supervisor Peskin).  In Supervisor Campos’s view, “it is only fair that Airbnb 
and others help us enforce the law.”  Id., Ex. N at 2. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard for Preliminary Injunction 
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) she is likely to succeed on 
the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the 
balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.”  Farris v. 
Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012).  Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ 
and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a 
preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable 
injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”  Id.  “[I]n the First Amendment context, the 
moving party bears the initial burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment rights 
have been infringed, or are threatened with infringement, at which point the burden shifts to the 
government to justify the restriction.”  Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 
(9th Cir. 2011).   For the following reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied these standards.    
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B. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed on the Merits of Their Claims  
1. The Ordinance Violates and Is Preempted By the CDA 
(a) The CDA Provides Broad Immunity to Websites for Third-Party 
Content 
The CDA bars the government from imposing liability on websites based on content 
provided by third parties.  It provides:  “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The law prohibits liability “under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3).  Section 230 “establish[es] broad ‘federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.’”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Nemet 
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (“plaintiffs may hold 
liable the person who creates or develops unlawful content, but not the interactive computer service 
provider who merely enables that content to be posted online.”).   
Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two goals.  First, it “wanted to encourage the 
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the 
development of e-commerce.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); 47 U.S.C. § 
230(b)(2) (statute intended to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet.”).  Second, it sought to encourage online providers to “self-police” for potentially 
harmful or offensive material by providing immunity for such efforts.  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; see 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  Congress recognized the Internet would not flourish if intermediaries could 
be liable for third-party content, “given the volume of material communicated through [it], the 
difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, and the relative lack of incentives to protect 
lawful speech.”  Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007); 
see Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028 (Section 230 intended to eliminate the “obvious chilling effect” that 
imposing liability on online providers would cause).  The CDA thus “sought to prevent lawsuits 
from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027-28. 
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Courts have interpreted the CDA to establish broad immunity for online providers, as the 
Ninth Circuit and nine other circuit courts have held.  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174-75, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Section 
230 provides a “broad grant of webhost immunity”); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (courts have recognized “a capacious conception of what it means to 
treat a website operator as the publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party”).7   
(b) Section 230 Provides a Straightforward Test for Website 
Immunity  
Section 230 sets forth a three-part test.  The law applies and provides immunity when (1) a 
party is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service,” and a law (2) “seeks to treat” the 
party “as a publisher or speaker” (3) “of information provided by another information content 
provider.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009).  Each of these elements 
is met here.   
First, Airbnb and HomeAway unquestionably are “interactive computer service” providers. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  And, as the Ninth Circuit has held, the “most common interactive computer 
services are websites.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6.   
Second, third parties (i.e., hosts listing their properties) undisputedly create and provide the 
online content that the Ordinance targets.  Third-party hosts create and provide descriptions of their 
listings, set the lengths of any particular rental, decide how many listings to place on platforms, and 
are responsible for lawfully registering their short-term rentals, obtaining a registration number 
from the City, and including those numbers “on any Hosting Platform listing.”  §§ 41A.5(g)(1)(F), 
                                                 
7 See Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419 (“Section 230 immunity should be broadly construed”); Almeida v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“federal circuits have interpreted [Section 
230] to establish broad federal immunity”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “consensus” that “§ 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing 
content provided primarily by third parties”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly”); Ricci v. Teamsters 
Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 
F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 
471 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. 
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(g)(2)(A).  Airbnb and HomeAway are not the content providers but merely provide the forum for 
the listings.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Furlong Decl. ¶ 6.  The Ordinance acknowledges this, defining a 
“Hosting Platform” as “an online platform that allows an Owner to advertise the Residential Unit 
through a website.”  § 41A.4 (emphasis added).   
Third, as discussed below, the Ordinance imposes requirements and liability on Plaintiffs 
for being the “publisher or speaker” of third-party content.  Indeed, the express purpose of the 
Ordinance is to impose obligations on Hosting Platforms to monitor, review, and, in practice, 
block listings (under the threat of potential criminal and civil penalties) to alleviate work the City 
would otherwise have to do to administer and enforce its short-term rental laws.  These acts are 
integral to Plaintiffs’ role as “publishers or speakers” of third-party content. 
(c) The Ordinance Treats Hosting Platforms as the Publisher or 
Speaker of Third-Party Content, in Violation of Section 230  
(i) The Ordinance Imposes Liability On Hosting Platforms 
Stemming From Transactions On Their Sites 
The Ordinance imposes liability on Hosting Platforms for transactions among third parties 
through their websites—i.e., prohibiting Booking Services for any property that is not “lawfully 
registered”—and therefore punishes them for their roles in publishing third-party content.  In effect, 
the Ordinance does the same thing as the Original Ordinance, just in a different guise—it imposes 
significant liability on Hosting Platforms if they “facilitate[] a short-term rental transaction,” 
§ 41A.4, for listings they publish allegedly in violation of the law (whether knowingly or not).   
Section 230 immunizes online providers from all liability stemming from “information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.”  Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330).  The law precludes not only claims challenging third-party content on its face (such as 
for defamation), but “all claims stemming from their publication of information created by third 
parties.”  MySpace, 528 F.3d at 418; see also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422 (argument that CDA “only 
immunizes” websites for “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter” content 
“misapprehends the scope of Section 230 immunity,” which also protects sites’ “inherent decisions 
about how to treat postings generally”); Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 690 
(S.D. Miss. 2014).  “[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action,” but whether the law 
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“inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided 
by another. . . . If it does, Section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02. 
Thus, as many cases have held, Section 230 immunity protects online providers for 
transactions and sales of goods and services through their websites—not just their publication of 
ads.  For example, in Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. App. 2012), the court dismissed a 
plaintiff’s claims that StubHub violated state anti-scalping laws because users offered and sold 
tickets at more than face value.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that he only sought to 
hold StubHub liable for its conduct, the transactions it facilitated, and the website’s features and 
“business model.”  Id. at 561-62.  Section 230 barred these claims, as StubHub “simply functioned 
as a broker, effectively putting a buyer and a seller into contact with each other in order to facilitate 
a sale at a price established by the seller.”  Id. at 563.  That StubHub allegedly “‘controlled’ the 
transaction by acting as an intermediary between buyer and seller,” “offered both buyers and sellers 
certain guarantees and assumed responsibility for handling the mechanics required to complete the 
transaction,” and charged a “fee” for these services was “irrelevant” to “immunity” under the CDA.  
Id. at 562; see id. at 563 (“that [StubHub] may have been on notice that its website could be used to 
make unlawful sales … does not support a decision stripping … immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230”); 
see also Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1121-22 (N.J. Super. 2010) (finding 
website immune under Section 230 for online ticket sales, rejecting state officials’ contention that 
they were only challenging website’s “commercial” activities and not its role as a “publisher or 
speaker,” and holding that the website’s conduct “fits squarely within the CDA’s purview,” as the 
“plain language of § 230 was designed to ‘promote the development of e-commerce’”).   
Similarly, in Stoner v. eBay Inc., 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000), the 
court dismissed a plaintiff’s claims seeking to hold eBay liable under the UCL and California 
criminal statutes for sales of bootleg recordings.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that his 
“suit [did] not seek to hold eBay responsible for the publication of information provided by others, 
but for eBay’s own participation in selling contraband musical recordings.”  Id. at *2-3.  “Despite 
plaintiff’s attempt to characterize eBay as an active participant in the sale of products auctioned 
over its service, plaintiff is seeking to hold eBay responsible for … information that originates with 
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the third party sellers who use the computer service.”  Id. at *2.  The fact that eBay offered a forum 
for third parties to buy and sell goods rather than a “bulletin board” for online postings, and 
“impos[ed] … a fee—including a fee based in part on the price at which an item is sold,” was 
irrelevant, as a “principal objective of the immunity provision is to encourage commerce over the 
Internet by ensuring that interactive computer service providers are not held responsible for how 
third parties use their services.”  Id. at *2-3; see also Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 
831-32 (2002) (barring claims against eBay for sale of fake sports memorabilia; “substance” of 
“allegations reveal [plaintiffs] ultimately seek to hold eBay responsible for conduct” within CDA).   
Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., 2011 WL 5829024 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011), also rejected 
a plaintiff’s argument that the “CDA applies only to communications, while [he sought] to hold 
eBay responsible for its conduct, ‘specifically, business transactions’” in facilitating the sale of an 
allegedly defective vacuum tube.  Id. at *6.  The court held that online sales transactions were part 
and parcel of eBay’s forum and “sales made by a third party are considered information for 
purposes of the CDA,” as “the alleged sale of vacuum tubes in this case was facilitated by 
communication for which eBay may not be held liable under the CDA.”  Id. at *7.8   
As in all of these cases, the Ordinance squarely violates Section 230 by imposing liability on 
Hosting Platforms for third-party transactions that directly result from their publication of third-party 
listings.  The Ordinance impermissibly treats Hosting Platforms as “publishers” or “speakers.” 
In addition, courts have rejected efforts to evade Section 230 by regulating a website’s 
receipt of funds stemming from publisher functions.  In Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 
2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), a challenged statute prohibited the sale of certain sex-related 
                                                 
8 Several other cases have held that the CDA immunizes websites for liability based on transactions 
and not merely for the content of user posts.  See, e.g., Hinton, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (Amazon 
immune for claims “concerning the sale of defective or illegal items” by third parties); Almeida v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 2004 WL 4910036, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2004) (claim challenging 
“Amazon’s sale of” book “preempted by” CDA as Amazon cannot be liable for “acts of non-parties” 
who “caused” book “to be sold on Amazon’s website”), aff’d, 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (Section 230 
preempted state law claim against Amazon for plaintiff’s images sold by a third-party through the 
Amazon website); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 2009 WL 1704355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) 
(CDA precluded claim against Craigslist for allegedly “fail[ing] to monitor, regulate, properly 
maintain and police the merchandise being bought and sold on its ... website”).   
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advertisements.  The government argued the law was “consistent with CDA Section 230 because the 
state law regulates conduct—the sale of advertisements—and not the speech itself, and therefore 
does not treat websites as ‘publishers or speakers.’”  Id. at 823.  The court saw through this, holding 
the “sale of online advertisements regulated by [the statute] derives from a website’s status and 
conduct as an online publisher of classified advertisements” as the “transaction of the sale is 
inherent in the classified service’s conduct as a publisher,” thus “trigger[ing]” the “protection of 
Section 230.”  Id. at 824 (emphasis added); cf. Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 233-34 
(7th Cir. 2015) (under CDA, website and credit card companies are protected “intermediaries” in 
transactions).  Likewise here, the act of receiving service fees is inherent in what Hosting Platforms 
do as publishers of third-party listings.  See Owen Decl. ¶ 8; supra at 4-5.   
Similarly, in Goddard v. Google, Inc., the plaintiff alleged she was injured as a result of 
clicking on ads posted on Google created by allegedly fraudulent providers of services for mobile 
devices.  2008 WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).  She sought to “avoid the application 
of § 230 by arguing that her UCL claim does not seek to treat Google as the publisher of third-party 
content,” as it “‘stems from Google’s acceptance of tainted funds’” from the ads.  Id. at *4.  The 
court rejected this as “an impermissible recharacterization.”  Id.  And in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google 
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff argued 
that its unjust enrichment claim—based on money Google received when users clicked on allegedly 
infringing Sponsored Links—was independent of any publishing conduct.  Rejecting this, the court 
held that plaintiff’s “claim turns on Google’s relationship with third party advertisers. …  The 
user’s decision to click on a Sponsored Link—the act that triggers the third party advertiser’s 
payment to Google—is in fact driven by content provided by the advertiser.”  Id. at 633 (emphases 
added).  No different here, a guest’s “decision to click” on a host’s listing and book that listing—
which may “trigger” a payment to the platform—is “driven by content provided by” a third party, 
i.e., the host’s listing.   
The City cannot parse the services Hosting Platforms offer, assert it is only imposing 
obligations (and liability) for transactions involving “Booking Services,” and thereby contend it is 
not challenging or seeking to regulate Airbnb’s and HomeAway’s central roles of providing online 
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forums for third-party listings.  “[C]ourts repeatedly have rejected attempts to recharacterize claims 
fundamentally based on the posting of online information in order to avoid § 230’s prohibition on 
‘treat[ing] [the defendant] as a ‘publisher’ of information.’”  Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at *4; 
see also MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419-20 (rejecting plaintiff’s assertions that her claims did not treat 
Myspace as a publisher but instead concerned the site’s conduct as “artful pleading,” because the 
claims fundamentally were “directed toward MySpace in its publishing, editorial, and/or screening 
capacities”).  If governments or plaintiffs could evade the CDA simply by asserting that they were 
challenging only websites’ processing of transactions among third parties but not their publication 
of information that is the basis for the transactions, that would punch a vast hole in the protection 
offered by the CDA.  Thousands of online retailers (from Amazon to eBay to Airbnb and 
HomeAway) and payment processors (such as PayPal) would risk liability that Section 230 
expressly precludes, losing the protection for e-commerce that Congress sought to encourage.  See 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027.  The Court should reject that result.   
(ii) The Ordinance Obligates Hosting Platforms to Monitor, 
Verify, and Screen Third-Party Listings 
The Ordinance also violates Section 230 by requiring Hosting Platforms to monitor, review, 
and verify third-party listings—and effectively block or remove such listings—to avoid liability.  
Congress expressly sought to prohibit states from chilling online speech in this way.  
Again, one of the central purposes of Section 230 was to encourage online providers to 
voluntarily monitor third-party content by immunizing all such efforts.  See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1122-23.  “[D]ecisions relating to the monitoring” of “content” are “actions quintessentially related 
to a publisher’s role [and] Section 230 ‘specifically proscribes liability’ in such circumstances.”  
Green, 318 F.3d at 471; accord MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420.  As the Ninth Circuit has said, “any 
activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to 
post online is perforce immune under Section 230.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71.  And 
Section 230 immunity applies not only to an online provider’s decision about whether to allow a 
given posting, but also decisions about the “construct and operation” of its website.  Lycos, 478 
F.3d at 422 (decisions about website policies and features are “as much an editorial decision … as a 
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decision not to delete a particular posting”); accord Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 16, 20-21 
(website’s decision not to provide “phone number verification” for user ads “fall[s] within the 
purview of traditional publisher functions” protected by Section 230).  
Cases interpreting Section 230 make clear that an online provider cannot be subject to 
liability for third-party content even if it receives notice that content is allegedly unlawful.  “It is, by 
now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough” 
to strip a website of Section 230 immunity.  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; accord Obado v. Magedson, 
2014 WL 3778261, at *7 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559; Goddard, 2008 WL 
5245490, at *3 (even if site has actual knowledge of alleged unlawful content, it is immune if it 
fails or refuses to delete it).  This is because “[l]iability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes 
advanced by § 230,” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333, and would subject providers to a “heckler’s veto,” as 
anyone who objected could provide notice and thereby impose the grim choice of removing content 
or facing litigation and liability, Jones, 755 F.3d at 407-08 (Section 230 “shields service providers 
from this choice”).   
Thus, courts have uniformly held that states cannot impose requirements on websites to 
verify advertisements provided by third-party users.  See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 
F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1273-74, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (striking down state statute imposing criminal 
liability on website operators if they failed to verify ages of individuals depicted in sexually related 
ads; “by imposing liability on online service providers who do not pre-screen content … the statute 
drastically shifts the unique balance that Congress created with respect to the liability of online 
service providers that host third party content”); see also Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (similar 
law that would have required websites to screen ads to assure compliance with state law violated 
CDA where “rather than encouraging unfettered speech,” the state law “impose[d] significant 
penalties,” and “preventing liability could amount to screening millions of advertisements”); Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294-95 (D.N.H. 2008) (“§ 230 bars” claim that 
defendant “fail[ed] to verify that a profile corresponded to the submitter’s true identity”).     
The Ordinance seeks to do what Section 230 forbids, by requiring Hosting Platforms to 
monitor and verify listings to determine if they are “lawfully registered on the Short-Term 
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Residential Rental Registry at the time the Residential Unit is rented for short term rental.” 
§ 41A.5(g)(4)(C); see also App. A, infra, at 1 (preface to Ordinance stating that it “require[s] 
Hosting Platforms to verify that a Residential Unit is on the City Registry” (emphasis added)).  That 
could require platforms not only to determine if there is a registration number associated with a 
listing, but also whether the rental is “lawfully registered,” i.e., whether it complies with other laws 
governing short-term rentals (for instance, regarding insurance and taxation).  The Ordinance does 
this not only once, but at least twice, as it also requires Hosting Platforms to attest under penalty of 
perjury they have not provided Booking Services to a host whose property is not “lawfully 
registered at the time [it] is rented.”  See §§ 41A.5(g)(4)(C)-(D).9 
For purposes of CDA immunity, it makes no difference whether the City imposes penalties 
against Hosting Platforms if they fail to verify that user listings are “lawfully registered” before 
publishing them (as the Original Ordinance provided) or instead if users make reservations for 
rentals (as in the Ordinance). The requirement to monitor third-party content triggers the CDA, 
even if it is not tied to publication.  In Stoner, for example, the court noted that “[a]t bottom, 
plaintiff’s contention” was “that eBay should be held responsible for failing to monitor the 
products auctioned over its service.”  2000 WL 1705637, at *3 (emphasis added).  In rejecting this 
claim, the court held that even if “it might be possible” for eBay “identify” unlawful products, 
“Congress intended to remove any legal obligation of interactive computer service providers to 
attempt to identify or monitor the sale of such products.”  Id. (emphasis added); see also Fields v. 
Twitter, 2016 WL 4205687, at *5, 8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) (dismissing claims Twitter 
provided material support to terrorists because it allowed ISIS to obtain accounts; though plaintiffs 
argued claims “not based on ‘the contents of tweets, the issuing of tweets, or the failure to remove 
tweets,” but rather “‘provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS,” CDA barred suit because it “would 
significantly affect Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content by effectively 
requiring Twitter to police and restrict its provision of Twitter accounts”).   
                                                 
9 Also, given that the Ordinance imposes liability absent “lawful[] registration at the time the 
Residential Unit is rented for short term rental,” § 41A.5(g)(4)(C) (emphasis added), this could 
require Plaintiffs to verify “lawful registration” a third time—when occupancy takes place, which in 
most instances will be weeks or months after online bookings.  Furlong Decl. ¶ 14.   
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In any event, the practical effect of the Ordinance is the same as the Original Ordinance.  
Hosting Platforms such as Airbnb and HomeAway (whom the City has admitted were the targets of 
the law) risk liability if they do not verify “lawful registration” of all listings at the time hosts seek to 
post them.  Assuming the Ordinance reaches HomeAway’s subscription model, the Ordinance might 
require verification from the point hosts sign up, because this is when HomeAway charges and 
collects a fee for “Booking Services” (whether or not the property is ever booked or rented).  More 
generally, under the Ordinance, both HomeAway and Airbnb would be at risk if they do not verify 
listings at the outset, because once a host and guest decide to enter into a transaction, Booking 
Services and payment services are provided immediately.  Owen Decl. ¶ 19; Furlong Decl. ¶ 6.    
In this manner, the Ordinance also impermissibly attempts to regulate the “overall design 
and operation” of Hosting Platforms’ websites.  See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 16, 20-21 (choice 
by Backpage allegedly “designed to encourage sex trafficking,” such as allowing anonymous 
payments and failing to verify phone numbers, were protected editorial decisions as to the “overall 
design and operation of the website”); Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *7 (CDA protects Twitter’s 
“decisions to structure and operate itself as a ‘platform … allow[ing] for the freedom of 
expression’”).  Requiring Hosting Platforms to verify whether a listing is “lawfully registered” 
would require them to make significant modifications to their sites and expend substantial financial 
and technical resources, introducing substantial delays in the booking process.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 17, 
19-20; Furlong Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15; see Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 668-69 (website “could hire 
a staff to vet the postings, but that would be expensive and may well be futile: if postings had to be 
reviewed before being put online, long delay could make the service much less 
useful”).   Alternatively, such platforms very likely will screen listings from appearing at all on 
their sites, Owen Decl. ¶ 19, 23-25; Furlong Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15—which is what the Original 
Ordinance sought to do, and what the City apparently determined was indefensible.10   
                                                 
10 The Ordinance also attacks websites’ decisions about their structure and operation by penalizing 
some models, but not others.  For example, the City has suggested that platforms that charge upfront 
fees solely for advertising, or sites that do not charge for rental listings at all but earn income through 
other channels (e.g., Craigslist), are not subject to the law.  See supra at 9; Blavin Decl., Ex. O at 2-
3.  If this is right, then HomeAway’s subscription model may not be covered by the Ordinance.  
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Congress’s intent in passing the CDA was to permit online providers to make decisions on 
their own about monitoring, screening or blocking third-party content.  Here, and exactly contrary 
to that intent, the City seeks to impose liability on Hosting Platforms if they do not monitor, 
identify and effectively block or remove third-party listings the City deems to be unlawful.  The 
Ordinance therefore violates and is preempted by Section 230. 
2. The Ordinance Violates the First Amendment 
The Ordinance also violates the First Amendment.  Because it imposes liability on Hosting 
Platforms, the Ordinance is a content-based restriction on speech subject to “heightened judicial 
scrutiny” under the First Amendment.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  For at least two reasons, the 
Ordinance cannot survive this scrutiny.  First, the City cannot show that the Ordinance is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a substantial governmental objective, id. at 572, given the obvious alternative of 
enforcing its short-term rentals laws directly against hosts who may violate them.  Second, the 
Ordinance imposes civil and criminal penalties on Hosting Platforms that publish listings for 
properties that are not “lawfully registered,” without any requirement that a Hosting Platform first 
have knowledge of the property’s status.  See §§ 41A.5(e), (g)(4)(C)-(D), 41A.7(b)(3).   The Court 
should enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance for these independently sufficient reasons. 
(a) The Ordinance Is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech that Is 
Subject to Heightened Judicial Scrutiny 
The Ordinance seeks to proscribe speech, in the form of rental listings, based on the content 
of that speech:  whether the listings advertise “lawfully registered” short-term rentals in a manner 
contrary to the Ordinance.  Such “content-based” restrictions on speech are subject to “heightened 
judicial scrutiny” under the First Amendment.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570. 
“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech 
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. 
                                                 
More importantly, these distinctions attack the decisions platforms have made as to the best manner 
to structure their websites to allow third-party content to flourish.  Instead of charging hosts an 
upfront-fee for advertising their listings, which could deter some hosts from publishing listings, 
Airbnb and HomeAway’s pay-per-book model charge users a service fee at the time of 
booking.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Furlong Decl. ¶ 4.  By basing a platform’s obligations and liability on 
this particular model, the Ordinance impermissibly targets these decisions.  
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Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  The Ordinance is content-based because it seeks to impose liability based 
on certain short-term rental listings on Hosting Platforms, which, by definition, allow hosts “to 
advertise” their properties “through a website” provided by the Hosting Platform.  § 41A.5(e) 
(emphasis added).  Publishing “paid commercial advertisements” constitutes protected commercial 
speech.  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).11  That the Ordinance constitutes a content-
based restriction on speech is also obvious given the law’s requirement that the City, “on at least a 
monthly basis,” undertake a “comprehensive review of active Hosting Platform listings” to identify 
“potentially non-compliant listings.”  § 41A.7(b) (emphasis added). 
First Amendment scrutiny is also triggered by the Ordinance’s requirements that Hosting 
Platforms verify in an affidavit their ongoing compliance with the law and its onerous recordkeeping 
provisions, which require Hosting Platforms to collect and maintain certain information for three 
years.  See §§ 41A.5(g)(4)(D)-(E).  In McKenna, for instance, the court invalidated a requirement 
that websites “check identification before publishing an escort ad.”  881 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.  The 
court reasoned that even though “at first blush,” the requirement “seems as commonsensical as 
requiring bar owners to check identification before allowing patrons to enter the door,” an 
“identification requirement—imposed by the government and punishable by imprisonment—related 
to speech” still must survive First Amendment scrutiny.  Id. at 1277-78; see also Free Speech Coal., 
Inc. v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 149, 164 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying heightened scrutiny to statute 
requiring adult entertainment producers to verify age of performers and keep records). 
The City may argue the Ordinance does not restrict speech but conduct, i.e., the acceptance 
of money in exchange for what the City nebulously defines as “Booking Services.” § 41A.4.  The 
City is not the first governmental entity to disguise a restriction on speech as a regulation of 
conduct, and courts reject such transparent attempts to avoid the First Amendment.  See, e.g., 
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566-67, 570 (rejecting Vermont’s effort to defend law as a restriction on 
“nonexpressive [commercial] conduct” where “[b]oth on its face and in its practical operation, 
                                                 
11 Plaintiffs do not concede that the Ordinance regulates only commercial speech but analyze it as 
though it does because “the outcome is the same” under the commercial speech or strict scrutiny 
tests.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571. 
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Vermont’s law imposes a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker”).  
In any event, the Supreme Court has made clear that restrictions on accepting monetary 
compensation for speech trigger First Amendment scrutiny because they create a “financial 
disincentive” to “publish … particular content.”  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).  For example, the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from seizing the revenue of works of art published by criminals depicting their crimes.  
Id. at 123.  Nor can the government prohibit its employees from receiving payment for speaking 
appearances.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1995).  The City 
cannot evade the First Amendment merely by attaching liability to payment rather than publication.   
(b) The Ordinance Cannot Survive Heightened Scrutiny Because It Is 
Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Substantial Government 
Interest 
“In the ordinary case, it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-
based.”  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571.  Such laws are “presumptively unconstitutional,” Reed, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2226, even when they pertain to commercial speech.  “Under a commercial speech inquiry, it is 
the State’s burden to justify its content-based law as consistent with the First Amendment.”  Sorrell, 
564 U.S. at 571-72; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980).  The government must show “the statute directly advances a substantial government interest” 
and there is a “‘fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.’”  
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995) (law must 
be “‘narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective’”); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.     
The City cannot demonstrate that the Ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial 
interest.  By its own terms, rather than operate “directly,” Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572, the Ordinance 
operates indirectly:  it aims to regulate the conduct of hosts by targeting the activities of Hosting 
Platforms.  This approach overlooks the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[t]he normal method for 
deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in 
it”; speech cannot “be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third 
party.”  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529-30; see also, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) (invaliding speech restriction where conduct “can be prohibited and 
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the penal laws used to punish such conduct directly”).   
That principle is especially relevant here, where the City has acknowledged that it can—and 
does—pursue hosts who fail to comply with the law rather than punish Hosting Platforms that 
publish listings.  The Ordinance requires the OSTR to “actively monitor Hosting Platform listings 
… on at least a monthly basis” to identify “potentially non-compliant listings.”  § 41A.7(b).  As of 
February 2016, the OSTR had assessed nearly $700,000 in penalties—equaling almost the entire 
annual OSTR budget.  Blavin Decl., Ex. G at 16, 21.  A report noted that the OSTR may be able to 
“further close” the “gap between the number of registered hosts and . . . hosts advertising short-term 
rentals on online platforms” after the OSTR became fully staffed in December 2015.  Id. at 21.  The 
same report acknowledged the City’s own role in frustrating compliance with short-term rental laws, 
noting that the complicated registration process—which forced residents to obtain certifications 
from both the OSTR and the Treasurer & Tax Collector in person—“might deter or confuse 
otherwise compliant short-term rental hosts.”  Id. at 26.  Supervisor Wiener also recently observed 
that there has been an “acceleration in the number of hosts registering,” and the City is “moving in a 
positive direction” in enforcing the law.  Id., Ex. Q at 3; see also id., Ex. G at 18 (City report noting 
“wave of compliant behavior towards the end of 2015”).   
The City has not even attempted to show that this obvious alternative of enforcing existing 
law directly against the hosts who violate it (and simplifying the law) cannot accomplish the City’s 
goals.  This shortfall alone invalidates the Ordinance’s provisions that restrict the speech of Hosting 
Platforms.  See Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2013) (enjoining anti-
solicitation law where state did not show ineffectiveness of directly enforcing “preexisting” laws to 
“address legitimate traffic safety concerns” instead of speech); McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 
(invalidating law banning publication of ads for commercial sex acts because state had “fail[ed] to 
demonstrate why a law targeting only the individuals who post ads would not be effective, rather 
than seeking to impose felony liability on online service providers”).   
Proponents of the Ordinance have suggested that imposing liability on Hosting Platforms for 
publishing listings will make the City’s regulatory scheme more effective and efficient in preventing 
unlawful conduct.  See Blavin Decl., Ex. J at 1.  That contention is both wrong and insufficient 
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under the First Amendment.  Enforcement against hosts would more directly advance the City’s 
stated goal of punishing “unscrupulous speculators” who list multiple properties in violation of the 
law, rather than “mom and pop” hosts.  Id., Ex. P at 1.  Penalties on Hosting Platforms, by contrast, 
will affect all hosts.  This disconnect between the City’s asserted aims and the speech-restrictive 
means chosen dooms the Ordinance.  See Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 827 (ban on roadside 
solicitation not narrowly tailored means of achieving interest in traffic safety).12  
In addition to being overinclusive (i.e., restricting more speech than necessary), the 
Ordinance is underinclusive, underscoring that it is not tailored to the City’s asserted interest.  
Under the City’s interpretation, the Ordinance would apply to Hosting Platforms that receive a fee 
for every booking (such as Airbnb and HomeAway’s pay-per-booking model) but not those with no 
fees at all (like Craigslist).  Thus, platforms with different business models could still help hosts and 
guests find each other (even if hosts’ properties are not “lawfully registered”).  This is not only a 
problem under the CDA, supra at 19-20 & n.10, but the First Amendment.  As the Supreme Court 
has held, “[u]nder-inclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact 
pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker[.]”  Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011); see Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 827-28; City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424-25 (1993) (invalidating law restricting 
commercial publications’ newspaper racks where “[t]he city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but 
respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain 
on Cincinnati’s sidewalks”).  
Moreover, even if the Ordinance would more efficiently prevent unlawful rentals and help 
the City enforce its short-term rental laws, this would be insufficient.  The First Amendment 
                                                 
12 The disconnect between the stated goals of the Ordinance and the speech-restrictive means chosen 
is further highlighted by the City’s failure to put forward evidence showing that the Ordinance will 
achieve its purported goal of bringing units back to the long-term rental market.  On the contrary, a 
recent study by the city planning and research organization SPUR states that “[d]ata from Airbnb 
suggests that the vast majority of properties listed in San Francisco are not being removed from the 
long-term residential market.”  Blavin Decl., Ex. R at 9; see also Owen Decl., Ex. 5 at 4 (rentals by 
Airbnb hosts who may list more than one home for short term rental are 0.18% of all units in City); 
Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405, 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (invalidating commercial 
speech restriction where it was “speculative” restriction would have its intended effect). 
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precludes the government from restricting advertising and speech simply because it may be more 
politically or administratively convenient.  See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 
(2002) (speech restrictions must be “a necessary as opposed to merely convenient means of 
achieving [the government’s] interests”); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 
1234 (9th Cir. 1994) (“‘The government cannot restrict the speech of the public … just in the name 
of efficiency.’”).  The City seeks to place the burden of verifying hosts’ compliance with the law on 
Hosting Platforms—a burden that is likely to be substantial, given the effort needed to verify each of 
thousands of San Francisco rental listings, and the onerous burdens placed on hosts, and one which 
could result in the suppression of vast amounts of protected speech.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 23-25; Furlong 
Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.  The government may not seek to “shift[] the burden of enforcing the law from the 
taxpayer” to speakers or publishers of information simply because it is easier to do so.  News & Sun 
Sentinel Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 693 F. Supp. 1066, 1072-73 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (invalidating law 
requiring newspaper to include contractors’ license numbers in all ads published for contractors). 
(c) The Ordinance Impermissibly Imposes Strict Liability on 
Publishers Without Proof of Scienter 
The Ordinance also violates the First Amendment because it imposes criminal penalties on 
publishers without requiring a showing they know the listings at issue are not “lawfully registered.”  
§ 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  The Supreme Court has long rejected the imposition of strict criminal liability 
for the dissemination of information, even where the content itself lacks First Amendment 
protection.  In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1960), the Court struck down an ordinance 
making it a crime for booksellers to possess obscene books, noting the law would require 
booksellers to review every book or face strict criminal liability, which “would tend to restrict the 
public’s access to forms of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress 
directly.”  Id. at 153-54.  The Court has said the same in later cases—the First Amendment bars 
imposing liability on publishers absent proof of mens rea that speech is in fact unlawful.  See New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (“[C]riminal responsibility may not be imposed without 
some element of scienter on the part of the defendant”); cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 
513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994).  The Court has made clear that similar principles apply in the civil 
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context.  See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“[A] rule that would 
impose strict liability on a publisher for [unprotected speech] would have an undoubted ‘chilling’ 
effect.”) 
The Ordinance violates this well-established principle.  It imposes severe criminal and civil 
penalties on publishers without any mens rea requirement.  For example, the Ordinance makes it 
unlawful for any Hosting Platform to provide “Booking Services” for a short-term rental unless the 
property is “lawfully registered” on the City’s registry.  § 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  It does not matter 
whether the platform knows the property is unregistered or not.  Similarly, the law requires Hosting 
Platforms to verify after-the-fact that they provided Booking Services to only properties that were 
“lawfully registered,” even if, at the time they provided Booking Services, the platform reasonably 
but mistakenly believed the property was “lawfully registered.”  § 41A.5(g)(4)(C)-(D).   That is 
precisely the approach the First Amendment forbids.  See, e.g., Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30 
(invalidating statute that imposed liability for sale of ads for commercial sex acts depicting minor 
where law “requires no actual knowledge of the age of anyone featured in the advertisement”). 
The constitutional defect posed by the lack of a scienter requirement in the Ordinance is 
compounded by the law’s multiple ambiguities, which make it even more difficult for Hosting 
Platforms to know whether they are complying with the law.  For instance, the Ordinance requires 
Hosting Platforms to verify that each rental is “lawfully registered” on the City’s registry.  
§ 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  Verifying a rental is “registered” for each of thousands of listings is highly 
burdensome.  Supra at 19.13   But verifying that the rental is otherwise “lawful” would be 
impossible, as this would penalize Hosting Platforms if they publish a listing for which the rental is 
registered, but for which the registration is unlawful—whether because the host does not have 
insurance, has not filed monthly tax reports, or has not accurately reported and paid taxes on “each 
piece of furniture, equipment, and supplies used in renting [the] residence,” such as “appliances,” 
                                                 
13 Indeed, it is unclear how a Hosting Platform would even do so, as the City must “redact [from the 
Registry] any Permanent Resident names and street and unit numbers from the records available for 
public review,” id. § 41A.4, and the federal Stored Communications Act prohibits Airbnb and 
HomeAway from divulging to the City for verification purposes any “information pertaining to” its 
users, including names and addresses, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3); see Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. v. 
CTIA-Wireless Ass’n, 752 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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“computers,” and “artwork.”  Blavin Decl, Ex. F at 1.  A Hosting Platform cannot possibly know 
whether a host has complied with the multitude of laws governing short-term rentals.  See Owen 
Decl. ¶ 18; Furlong Decl. ¶ 15.  The First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability on this 
basis.  See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A 
scienter requirement of knowledge as applied to an unknowable element cannot save a provision 
from constitutional invalidity.”).       
The Ordinance’s requirement that Hosting Platforms verify that each rental is “lawfully 
registered … at the time it is rented,” § 41A.5(g)(4)(C) (emphasis added), further exacerbates this 
constitutional infirmity.  This language suggests that a Hosting Platform may be liable even if a 
rental is lawfully registered at the time of the reservation, but not at the time of the occupancy.  A 
Hosting Platform can never know when it provides “Booking Services,” i.e., when it publishes the 
listing and enables a reservation and/or accepts a fee, whether a property will be “lawfully 
registered” at the time of occupancy.  The Ordinance thus would seem to impermissibly impose 
criminal liability on Hosting Platforms even if they have no way of knowing the listings are not 
lawfully registered.  See Wasden, 376 F.3d at 933.   
These ambiguities, while problematic standing alone, are constitutionally intolerable in an 
Ordinance that seeks to impose strict criminal liability in connection with the publication of 
information.  See Brown, 564 U.S. at 807 (ambiguity “in a law that regulates expression ‘raises 
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech’”). 
C. Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Harm Unless the Ordinance is Enjoined 
For several reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction.   
First, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373; see also Farris, 677 F.3d at 
868.  Such harm to free speech is relevant both under the First Amendment and the CDA, which as 
the Ninth Circuit has held, “sought to further First Amendment … interests on the Internet.”  Batzel, 
333 F.3d at 1028 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H8469–72 (1995)).   
Second, Plaintiffs face the threat of prosecution under a preempted law, which constitutes 
irreparable harm.  See Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1029 (“irreparable harm” where plaintiff 
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“demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution” under preempted law); Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (“irreparable injury” where “attorneys general … made clear 
that they would seek to enforce” preempted law and plaintiffs faced “Hobson’s choice” between 
“expos[ing] themselves to potentially huge liability” or “suffer[ing] the injury of obeying” law).   
Third, the risk of criminal penalties, including jail time, also constitutes irreparable harm.  
See Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) (irreparable 
harm where, “[a]bsent injunctive relief, Plaintiffs may face serious criminal liability”); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1948) (where “defiance would have carried with it the risk of heavy 
fines and long imprisonment,” “imminence of irreparable injury” shown). 
Fourth, the risk of hefty fines constitutes irreparable harm.  The Ordinance authorizes fines 
of up to $1,000 for each violation, i.e., each time Plaintiffs provide Booking Services for a short-
term rental without a “lawful” registration.  Given that Airbnb and HomeAway publish thousands 
of listings in the City, Owen Decl. ¶ 23; Furlong Decl. ¶ 2, this could result in fines in the millions 
of dollars if even a fraction are not “lawfully registered.”  Courts have found irreparable harm based 
on fines of this magnitude.  See, e.g., Satellite Television of N.Y. Assocs. v. Finneran, 579 F. Supp. 
1546, 1551 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (irreparable harm “readily” shown where plaintiff “faced with a choice 
of” complying or incurring “fine of $2,000 a day”).   
The prospect of criminal and civil penalties is not hypothetical.  The Ordinance squarely 
takes aim at both Airbnb’s and HomeAway’s operations, as evidenced by the public statements by 
the proponents of the Ordinance.  Blavin Decl., Ex. N at 2 (Supervisor Campos: “it is only fair that 
Airbnb and others help us enforce the law”); see id. (Supervisor Wiener noting desire for law to 
apply to “VRBO or HomeAway”); id., Ex. B at 4; Ex. H at 1.  In these circumstances, courts have 
found irreparable harm.  See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 819 (high likelihood of enforcement where 
Backpage.com was “direct target” of law); McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (same). 
Fifth, the Ordinance gives rise to irreparable injury by disrupting Plaintiffs’ operations and 
threatening a loss of consumer goodwill.  Again, the law would force Airbnb and HomeAway to 
verify each property in a listing is “lawfully registered” before providing Booking Services.  
§ 41A.5(g)(4)(C).  Given the volume of listings on Plaintiffs’ websites and the continual addition 
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and modification of listings, this would require Plaintiffs to change their platforms, expend 
significant resources, and delay the availability of booking and reservation services.  Owen Decl. 
¶¶ 17-24; Furlong Decl. ¶ 11.  Verifying that each listing is associated with a registration number—
not to mention determining whether the rental is “lawfully registered” and otherwise complies with 
the law—would require dedicated teams of employees manually obtaining and reviewing 
information from users and the City for each listing, requiring substantial financial and personnel 
resources.  Owen Decl. ¶ 17; Furlong Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15.  These changes themselves likely would repel 
users and cause a loss of goodwill.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 20-22; Furlong Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.   
Given this, Plaintiffs likely would have no choice but to screen and remove listings from 
their platforms altogether, including lawful ones.  Owen Decl. ¶¶ 19, 23-25; Furlong Decl. ¶ 19.  
The resulting loss of consumer trust and goodwill constitutes irreparable harm.  Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (irreparable harm exists 
where preempted law will cause “part of” plaintiff’s “business” and “goodwill” to “evaporate”); 
Mahroom v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 2009 WL 248262, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (“[m]ajor 
disruption of a business” threatening “goodwill” is “irreparable harm”). 
Finally, when unlawful regulations create the perception that a company’s activities are 
illegal, the resulting loss in goodwill is irreparable.  See Aeroground, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (irreparable harm where party “is refusing to 
comply with a rule that it believes is preempted by federal law”).  Here, the Ordinance engenders 
the inaccurate perception that Plaintiffs’ activities may be illegal, creating confusion among 
potential hosts and guests alike, and driving consumers away from their platforms.   
D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor Plaintiffs 
The balance of equities tips decidedly in favor of Plaintiffs.  They face deprivation of their 
constitutional rights, which far outweighs any harm the City might claim.  Klein v. City of San 
Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).  Harms to Plaintiffs in the form of impending 
criminal penalties and fines, as well as lost goodwill, also weigh in their favor.  The City can claim 
little harm to outweigh these significant injuries.  Indeed, the City does not face disruption of 
established practices.  McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (“harm to the government [is not] great” 
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where “‘[n]o prosecutions have yet been []taken’”). 
The public interest also strongly favors Plaintiffs.  The public interest is served by “the 
Constitution’s declaration that federal law is to be supreme.”  Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1059-60; 
see Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 847-48 (8th Cir. 1999) (“public interest will perforce 
be served by enjoining the enforcement of [preempted] state law”).  In addition, “‘it is always in the 
public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’”  Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 
F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012).  It also is in the public interest to protect Plaintiffs from criminal 
liability and lost consumer goodwill resulting from unlawful regulation.  By contrast, an injunction 
would not prevent the City from enforcing its laws against those non-compliant hosts who directly 
violate them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their motion for a 
preliminary injunction.   
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FILER’S ATTESTATION 
I, Jonathan H. Blavin, am the ECF user whose identification and password are being used to 
file this Joint Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 
5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that the other above-named signatory concurs in this filing. 
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